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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ATHENS:
A CASE STUDY
ADRIAAN LANNI *
ABSTRACT
This Article presents our first well-documented example of a
self-conscious transitional justice policy—the classical Athenians’
response to atrocities committed during the reign of the Thirty
Tyrants—as a case study that can offer insight into the design of
modern transitional justice institutions. The Athenians carefully
balanced retribution and forgiveness: an amnesty protected
collaborators from direct prosecution, but in practice private
citizens could indirectly sanction even low-level oligarchic
sympathizers by raising their collaboration as character evidence in
unrelated lawsuits.
They also balanced remembering and
forgetting: discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized
the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed
the widespread collaboration by ordinary citizens, depicting the
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.
This case study of Athens’ successful reconciliation offers new
insight into contemporary transitional justice debates.
The
Athenian experience suggests that the current preoccupation with
uncovering the truth may be misguided. The Athenian case also
counsels that providing an avenue for individual victims to pursue
local grievances can help minimize the impunity gap created by
the inevitably selective nature of transitional justice.
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INTRODUCTION

Most accounts of transitional justice institutions begin with the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following World War II. 1 But, of
course, the challenge of moving on after civil war or mass atrocity
is much older—as old as organized society itself. The ancient
Athenian democracy provides our first well-documented example
of a self-conscious transitional justice policy. This case study of
Athens’ successful reconciliation following civil war offers new
insight into several contemporary debates over the design of
modern transitional justice institutions. More specifically, the
Athenian experience suggests that the current focus on uncovering
the truth may be misguided. The Athenian case also counsels that
providing an avenue for individual victims to pursue local
grievances can help minimize the impunity gap created by the
inevitably selective nature of transitional justice.
In 404 B.C.E., Athens experienced a civil war marked by
horrific violence: in an eight month-period, an oligarchic coup led
by the “Thirty Tyrants” resulted in the killing of between five and
ten percent of the citizenry as well as the expulsion, by some
accounts, of more than half the population. 2 The restored
democracy arrived at a careful balance between retribution and
forgiveness. Formally, all but the top officials in the former regime
were given amnesty, but in practice private citizens could
1 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 27 (1998)
(“By the end of the twentieth century, politicians, leaders, and human rights
activists cited these trials as landmark contributions to the struggles for a just
world order.”).
2 For discussion on the number of Athenians killed, see ISOCRATES,
Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I 182, 197 (David C. Mirhady & Yun Lee Too trans.,
Univ. of Tex. Press 2000) (discussing how the Thirty Tyrants executed fifteen
hundred citizens without trial) [Isoc. 7.67]; AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in
AESCHINES 159, 244 (Chris Carey trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 2000) [Aesch. 3.235];
ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY
AND OLIGARCHY 139, 178 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986) (showing that the Thirty
embarked on a killing rampage, killing “no less than fifteen hundred men”) [Ar.
Ath. Pol. 35.4]; BARRY S. STRAUSS, ATHENS AFTER THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 70–86
(1986) (providing a figure for the lowest estimate of the male citizen population at
14,000–16,250); JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 127 (1989)
(estimating that the population range throughout the fourth century was 20,00030,000). As for the expulsion, see DIODORUS OF SICILY, Book XIV, in DIODORUS OF
SICILY VI 1, 23 (C. H. Oldfather trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1933) (stating that more
than half the Athenian population was driven to flee by the murders and lawless
actions of the Thirty) [Diodorus Diod. 14.5.7]; ISOCRATES, supra note 2, at 182, 197
(declaring that over five thousand were expelled) [Isoc. 7.67].
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indirectly sanction even low-level oligarchic sympathizers by
raising their collaboration as character evidence in unrelated
lawsuits.
The Athenians also balanced remembering and
forgetting: discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized
the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed
the widespread collaboration by ordinary citizens, depicting the
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.
The Athenian reconciliation, which endured until Athens was
defeated by Philip of Macedon, was admired throughout Greece
for its success in avoiding the cycle of revolution and counterrevolution that afflicted other Greek city-states in the classical
period.
This Article begins by examining why the Athenian
reconciliation was so successful. I argue that Athens’ unique legal
culture permitted the amnesty to be implemented in a way that
promoted unity while at the same time avoiding a sense of
impunity at the local level. There were three aspects to this. First,
in the generation following the war, speeches in the Athenian
courts helped cultivate reconciliation by creating a unifying
(though misleading) collective memory of the civil war that
focused blame narrowly on the Thirty Tyrants, downplayed the
extent of collaboration, and depicted the Amnesty not as a
politically expedient compromise but as proof of the Athenians’
moderation and superior character. Second, litigants’ collaboration
or resistance during the tyranny was often raised as character
evidence in unrelated lawsuits and in fitness examinations for
public officials. Athenian jury verdicts could turn on this evidence,
and the very experience of being accused of collaboration before
hundreds of jurors constituted a form of shaming punishment.
These indirect sanctions minimized resentment at the local level by
providing some limited accountability for crimes committed
during the war, while also encouraging former collaborators to
publicly pledge their allegiance to the democracy. Finally, Athens’
civic institutions, including courts, required the regular, active
participation of Athenian citizens. These institutions helped repair
individual social relationships by forcing former oligarchs and
democratic rebels to work together productively.
Can the Athenian experience tell us something about how we
should respond to civil war and mass atrocity today? Ancient
Athens may seem too far removed from the modern cultural
context to provide a useful comparison. But those who study and
design transitional justice institutions are already in the business of
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trying to draw lessons from settings that are quite different from
one another—from Latin America to Western Europe to South
Africa to Rwanda to Cambodia.
In addition, scholars of
transitional justice have tried to draw lessons from historical as
well as contemporary transitions. 3 Athens offers another case
study—in some ways an exceptionally useful one, because we
know that the Athenian reconciliation worked over the long term.
Of course, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from a single
case study. We will see that the Athenians’ idiosyncratic attitude
toward the rule of law precludes the direct adoption of the
Athenian approach. But we may be able to draw some mid-level
observations from the Athenian case, observations that may be
worth testing against other case studies in future transitional
justice research while bearing in mind the design of contemporary
transitional justice institutions.
First, the Athenian reconciliation demonstrates the importance
of addressing reconciliation on the local level, both by providing
an outlet for private resentments and by encouraging individuals
on opposite sides of the conflict to work together. Centralized
institutions that focus exclusively on high-level offenders may not
be as effective as schemes that permit individual victims to air
complaints. Such decentralized, victim-centered approaches can
take many forms; recent transitional justice experiments that
incorporate this feature include South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and Rwanda’s Gacaca courts. Most
controversially, the Athenian case casts some doubt on an
assumption underlying the recent proliferation of truth
commissions: the cardinal value of uncovering the truth behind
the violence.
Section 1 introduces the paper while Section 2 briefly describes
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and the terms of the reconciliation
agreement.
Sections 3 and 4 explore why the Athenian

3 See generally JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004) (discussing several historical transitions, including
Athens in 411 and 403 B.C. and France from 1814–1815); MINOW, supra note 1
(including a variety of historical examples, including most prominently, postWorld War II Germany); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 27 (2000) (discussing
a variety of transitions, including those in Germany, Argentina, Greece, Latin
America, Central Europe, and Latin America); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 762, 771–77 (2004)
(examining a wide range of historical transitions, including the American Civil
War and the French Revolution).
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reconciliation succeeded, tracing the decisive role played by the
Athenian courts. Section 5 discusses what we might learn from
Athens’ successful response to mass atrocity.
2.

THE TERROR

More Athenians were killed by the Thirty Tyrants in their ninemonth reign than were killed in ten years during the
Peloponnesian War. 4 What follows is a basic account of the
violence, with a particular emphasis on what we can discern about
the level of complicity of various elements of the population.
Although there are discrepancies in the sources and many facts
about the oligarchic period are still contested by historians,5
particularly the chronology of events, these debates are not
relevant to our story and I will largely avoid them.
2.1. Accession of the Thirty and Judicial Murder
The Athenian Assembly had little choice in the initial
appointment of the Thirty. The Athenians had been soundly
defeated by the Spartans and were literally starving because of a
Spartan blockade when they agreed to surrender, tear down their
walls, and hand over most of their fleet. Under pressure from the
Spartan commander, 6 the Assembly acceded to the local oligarchic
faction and appointed thirty men to draft a constitution in
accordance with the ancestral laws (patrioi nomoi). 7 Once in power,

4 See XENOPHON, HELLENICA 157 (Carleton Brownson trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1918) (showing that the number of fatalities was less during the
Peloponnesian War than during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.21].
5 See, e.g., PETER KRENTZ, THE THIRTY AT ATHENS 64–67 (1982) (highlighting
competing theories regarding certain aspects of the reign of the Thirty); THOMAS
CLARK LOENING, THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT OF 403/402 B.C. IN ATHENS
(1987) (examining the reconciliation agreement in depth); MARTIN OSTWALD, FROM
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW 460–90 (1986) (detailing the
reign of the Thirty); ANDREW WOLPERT, REMEMBERING DEFEAT (2002) (analyzing the
civil war and its aftermath); Edwin Carawan, Amnesty and Accountings for the
Thirty, 56.1 CLASSICAL Q. 57, 57–76 (2006) (calling into question an interpretation of
the nature of the accounting levied in the aftermath of the civil war).
6 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS 113, 131 (S.C. Todd trans., Univ. of
Tex. Press 2000) (revealing the Spartan Lysander’s threat to the lives of the
assemblymen) [Lys. 12.71–75]; DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 14–17 (showing how
Lysander ordered the appointment of the Thirty to head the state) [Diod. 14.3.2–
7].
7 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 116–19 (illustrating the first treacherous
steps the oligarchy took with the consent of Lysander) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14].
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the Thirty ignored the order to draft a constitution and instead
appointed magistrates and a new Council of 500 from among their
supporters. 8 Even more ominous, they hired 300 “whip-bearing
servants” to carry out their orders and intimidate the populace. 9
While it is not clear whether the Assembly decree appointing the
Thirty authorized them to govern Athens temporarily until the
new constitution was drafted, 10 there is no question that by
refusing to issue a constitution and taking complete and indefinite
control over the government, the Thirty crossed the line into illegal
rule.
The Thirty immediately set to work eliminating their
opponents. Jury courts had been suspended during the war and
were not revived by the Thirty. Instead, the Thirty tried opponents
before the Council of 500, which they packed with their own
supporters. This was judicial murder. The trials appear to have
been a farce: they dispensed with the secret ballot, and often relied
on evidence from informants coerced to testify under threat of
death. 11 One description of a trial held soon after the Thirty rose to
power against men who had opposed the peace treaty with Sparta
recounts the intimidating atmosphere, as members of the Council
publicly cast their votes in front of the Thirty.
The Thirty were seated on the dais. Two tables were set out
in front of them, and one had to cast one’s vote not into
voting urns but openly on these tables, with the vote to
convict going on the further table: so how could any of
8 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 177 (stating that the Thirty disregarded the
purpose for which they had been appointed and proceeded to use their
appointment to wrest and maintain control of the city) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.1];
XENOPHON, supra note 4, 116–19 (detailing how the Thirty misused their office to
further their own goals) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14].
9 See ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, at 139, 177 (discussing
how the hiring of such servants was part of the oligarchy’s plan to control the
city) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.1].
10 The subject of politeusousi in Xenophon’s description of the Assembly
decree is unclear, but may refer to the Thirty. XENOPHON, supra note 4, 113–15
[Xen. Hell. 2.3.2]. For discussion, see OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 477–78, n.70
(attempting to determine the exact powers conferred on the Thirty); KRENTZ, supra
note 5, at 50 (arguing that the Thirty were elected as a government and not simply
as a legislative commission).
11 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 147, 151–52
(detailing the unfair mode by which the victims were put to death) [Lys. 13.36, 61–
62]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing that the Thirty killed on account
of personal enmity and expediency) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22].
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them [i.e., the defendants] be rescued? In a word, the death
penalty was passed on all who went to the Councilchamber to face trial. 12
At first, the Thirty executed only a small number of political
opponents and “sycophants” (men known for bringing frivolous
prosecutions). Despite the procedural irregularity of these trials,
both Xenophon and Aristotle’s the Constitution of the Athenians 13
report that these actions were widely popular. 14 Over time, the
executions multiplied, and, with them, opposition to the regime:
Xenophon describes the “great numbers continually—and
unjustly—put to death,” causing “many to band together and
wonder what the state was coming to.” 15
2.2. The Creation of the 3000 and Widespread Extrajudicial Killings
Theramenes, one of the Thirty, opposed the prosecutions,
arguing that the terror tactics were alienating potential supporters
and weakening the regime. In response, the Thirty agreed to
widen their base of support slightly by drawing up a list of 3000
citizens who would participate in the government,
disenfranchising the remaining three-quarters of the population. 16
To the extent we can discern the motivations of the Thirty, they
appear to have wanted to establish a society along the Spartan
model, in which a narrow group of elite homoioi would exercise
citizenship rights, relegating the rest of the population to a second12 LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 147, 151–52 [Lys.
13.36, 61–62].
13 The Constitution of the Athenians was not an enacted constitution, but a
partial history and description of Athenian political and legal institutions
probably written by Aristotle or his students. See ADRIAAN LANNI, LAW AND
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 6 (2006).
14 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 118–19 (showing that citizens who were not
under threat of guilt were pleased with the first condemnatory and punitive steps
of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.12]; ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2,
at 139, 178 (describing the initial delight of the populace with the actions of the
Thirty that they deemed to be motivated by noble intentions) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.3].
15 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing Theramenes’ musings on
whether the state was being led in a good direction) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22].
16 See ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, at 139, 178
(describing the circumstances leading to the list of 3000 as well as Theramenes’
criticisms of the creation of the list) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.1–2]; see also XENOPHON, supra
note 4, at 121–23 (describing the creation of the 3000 as a response to Theramenes’
concerns about the disempowerment of the citizens under the oligarchy) [Xen.
Hell. 2.3.18–22].
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class status. 17 The 3000 appear to have been handpicked by the
Thirty. 18 In practice, the 3000 did not play an active role in the
government; we know of only one meeting of the full 3000 and one
other meeting involving all hoplites and cavalry on the list, both of
which were held after the democratic opposition had gained the
upper hand and the Thirty was on the defensive. 19
The consequences of exclusion from the list of 3000 went
beyond the humiliation of formal disenfranchisement. The Thirty
announced that anyone not in the 3000 could be killed by the
Thirty without trial, while members of the 3000 had a right to a
trial before the Council. 20 Not long after the list of 3000 was
published, the Thirty collected the arms of the disenfranchised and
began a brutal killing spree. 21 Xenophon suggests that many of the
murders were motivated by personal enmity or a desire to
confiscate property rather than because of political opposition. 22
The Thirty’s decision to kill a number of metics (resident aliens) at
17 See, e.g., KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 64–67 (stating that the Thirty attempted to
reform Athens using a “model of idealized Sparta” and comparing the structural
hierarchy of the Thirty and the 3000 with the structures of Sparta’s government);
see also OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 485–87 (analyzing the adoption of portions of the
Spartan system by the Thirty and comparing and contrasting the 3000 with the
Spartan homoioi and hoplite class); David Whitehead, Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants,
in 13/14 ANCIENT SOCIETY 106, 106–30 (1982–83) (discussing the reasons why the
Thirty sought to remodel Athenian society as Sparta).
18 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (describing the arbitrary factors used by
the Thirty to select the list of 3000 and the secrecy surrounding the list and its
revisions prior to its delayed publication) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.2].
19 See, e.g., XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 148–49, 156–59 (discussing the limited,
inconsistent participation of the 3000 in the violence and the minor role of the
3000 during the deposition of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9, 2.4.23]; ARISTOTLE, supra
note 2, at 179 (describing the marginal role of the 3000 within the violent rule of
the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.1].
20 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (suggesting that the additional
protection granted to the 3000 was minimal and arguing that the list of 3000 did
not create a significant obstacle to the Thirty’s attempts to rid themselves of
opposition) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.1]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 120–21, 139–41
(describing how the Thirty simply struck Theramenes’ name from the list of 3000
when it became apparent that the Council would not vote to condemn
Theramenes and executed him without the vote) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, 2.3.50–51].
21 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 179 (detailing the disarmament of the
general population and the continuing violence of the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2];
see also XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the growing confidence of the
Thirty and the expanding scope of their actions) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1].
22 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that the Thirty “put many
people to death out of personal enmity, and many also for the sake of securing
their property.”) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–21].
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one point was attributed to several different motivations:
xenophobia, elimination of the political opposition, and the desire
to confiscate property. 23 Isocrates claims that the number of people
executed without trial by the Thirty over these three months was
more than the number of subjects the Athenians put on trial during
the entire period of its empire. 24
2.3. Informers and Citizens’ Arrests
In addition to acquiescing to the senseless violence, ordinary
citizens sometimes served as informers or assisted in arrests.
However rigged they may have been, trials before the Council still
required some showing of evidence; this evidence could be
provided by willing or unwilling informers. The trial of one such
informer after the restoration of the democracy survives.25
Predictably, the defendant seems to have made the assertion that
he only testified because he was under duress, but the prosecution
argues that the defendant was a willing informant, pointing out
that the defendant had a chance to escape and refuse to become an
informant by fleeing Athens but did not take it. 26 Interestingly, the
prosecutor’s narrative reveals that informers were often subject to
considerable pressure. The prosecutor recounts how another man,
Menestratus, became an informer only after he was arrested on a
capital charge so that he could gain immunity; the prosecutor
praises the heroism of one Aristophanes who refused to become an
informant and was executed as a result; and the prosecutor’s case
is predicated on the notion that the defendant would have had to
go into voluntary exile to avoid serving as an informer. 27
23 Xenophon (2.3.20-22) and Lysias (12.6) attribute the Thirty’s actions to
greed. XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 123 [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]; LYSIAS, Against
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS supra note 6, at 113, 116–17 [Lys. 12.4]. Others dismiss the
arguments attributing the murders to greed and fear and suggest that the Thirty
ordered the killings to suppress political opposition. See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at
80–82. Xenophobia is also presented as a possible motivation for the Thirty’s
action against the metics. See OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 487.
24 See ISOCRATES, Panegyricus, in ISOCRATES II 23, 55–56 (Terry L. Papillon
trans., 2004) [Isoc. 4.113].
25 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 140–60 (prosecuting
Agoratus for his actions as an informer) [Lys. 13].
26 See id. at 146, 149–50 (stating that Agoratus could have left instead of
becoming an informant but chose to stay because he believed he would be
rewarded for being an informant) [Lys. 13.31, 52].
27 See id. at 149–52 (arguing that Agoratus was guilty of the same crimes as
Menestratus and therefore should be punished with the same sentence as
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The guilt of citizens who actually carried out arrests and turned
individuals over to the Thirty is murkier. In Plato’s Apology,
Socrates recounts how the Thirty ordered him and four others to
arrest Leon of Salamis so that he could be put to death. According
to Socrates, the Thirty “often ordered many others to do such
things, since they wanted to implicate as many others in their
causes.” 28 While the four others arrested Leon, Socrates simply
went home, neither taking part in the arrest nor trying to save or
warn Leon. Socrates was not punished for his disobedience.
Perhaps, as Socrates claims, the Thirty would have killed him in
retaliation if the regime had not been close to collapse. Perhaps
Socrates’ special stature and association with Critias, his former
student and a leader of the Thirty, saved him. Or perhaps the
failure to carry out an arrest was less likely to provoke retaliation
from the tyrants than other offenses. One source suggests that
some citizens took revenge on personal enemies by initiating
summary arrests during the killing spree. 29 After the restoration of
the democracy, court speakers would at times declare their clean
record during the oligarchy by stating that in addition to not being
members of the Council or officers under the Thirty, they also did
not carry out any arrests. 30 This suggests that citizen arrests were
common, were regarded as particularly blameworthy, or both. It is
interesting that speakers generally do not state that they did not
serve as informers; while having been an informer may have been
considered morally blameworthy, informers do not appear to have
been considered part of the oligarchy in the same way that those
who carried out arrests were. It seems that while it was
understood that many informers testified under the true threat of
death, there was a suspicion that at least some of the citizens who
Menestratus and suggesting that Agoratus should be responsible for his choice
because others such as Aristophanes did not make the same decision under
similar circumstances) [Lys. 13.52–61].
28 PLATO, Apology of Socrates, in THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SOCRATES 57
(Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith eds., 2002) [Pl. Apol. 32c-d].
29 See LYSIAS, For the Soldier, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 95, 96–100 (detailing a
soldier’s argument that he was being accused for nothing more than enmity) [Lys.
9].
30 See id. at 98–99 (demonstrating that the lack of participation in public office
could be used as evidence supporting innocence) [Lys. 9.13–17]; see, e.g., LYSIAS,
On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 260, 265
(defending against allegations of oligarchic sympathies by stating that “during the
oligarchy nobody suffered summary arrest at my hands, none of my enemies was
punished, and none of my friends was rewarded”) [Lys. 25.15].
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carried out arrests initiated the action themselves or could have
avoided carrying out the Thirty’s orders.
2.4. Involuntary Exile, Massacre at Eleusis, and the Rise of the
Democratic Opposition
At some point after the extra-judicial murders of those
excluded from the 3000, the Thirty took the additional step of
banning everyone excluded from the 3000 from the urban center
Most of the displaced
and confiscating their property. 31
individuals settled in the Piraeus, the port and commercial center
of Athens; some may have gone into exile. 32
By this point, an opposition force made up of a small number
of citizens and a larger group of mercenaries and resident aliens
had formed. 33 When the resistance won a number of victories, the
Thirty became nervous and decided to take the village of Eleusis, a
town within Athens’ territory, as a possible refuge. Xenophon
describes in detail how the Thirty murdered the male inhabitants
in order to take control over the town. 34 The cavalry ordered a
mandatory registration of male Eleusinians under the pretense of
determining how large a garrison to leave in the town. 35 After
each man registered, he was ordered to walk out the city gate,
where each was arrested and brought to Athens. 36 Xenophon
continues:
On the following day they summoned to the Odeum the
hoplites who were on the roll and the cavalry also. Then

See LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note
6, at 260, 267 (recounting the expulsion of other citizens from the town) [Lys.
25.22]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the evictions mandated by the
Thirty as one of the expansions of the Thirty’s power after the death of
Theramenes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1].
32 See WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing how those not enrolled in the
Three Thousand, fled to Piraeus to escape the tyranny of the Thirty). Compare
DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty transferred citizens with
no political rights to Piraeus while others were exiled) [Diod. 14.32.4] with
XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (noting that the exiled fled to Piraeus) [Xen. Hell.
2.4.1].
33 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 83–84 (detailing the composition of the men at
Phyle: about 100 were Athenians, 300 were mercenaries, and 300 were foreigners).
34 For a detailed description of the Thirty’s strategy to take control of Eleusis,
see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10].
35 Id. at 147 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8].
36 Id. at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10].
31
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Critias [one of the Thirty] rose and said: “We, gentlemen,” .
. . “are establishing this government no less for you than for
ourselves. Therefore, even as you will share in honours, so
also you must share in the dangers. Therefore you must
vote the condemnation of the Eleusinians who have been
seized, that you may have the same hopes and fears as
we.” 37
Those present were then instructed to vote in the open, in the
presence of both the Thirty and the armed Spartan guards who had
been requested to help the oligarchy keep control of Athens.38
Nearly the entire male population of Eleusis was executed in this
manner. The Thirty also massacred the inhabitants of Salamis,
though our sources do not report how the murders were carried
out or whether a similar vote was arranged. 39
When the opposition forces approached the Piraeus, many of
the citizens excluded from the city, as well as metics, foreigners,
and even slaves joined the fight. 40 The rebels routed the Thirty in
Piraeus, killing two of their leaders, including Critias. Following
this defeat, the 3000 met in Athens and voted to replace the Thirty
with a board of Ten; the deposed members of the Thirty settled in
Eleusis. 41 As the opposition grew in strength and threatened to

XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 149 (footnotes omitted) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9].
Xenophon and Aristotle offer very different accounts of when the Spartan
garrison was called in. According to Xenophon (2.3.14) they were called in very
early in the reign of the Thirty, while Aristotle (37.2) states that they did not arrive
until much later, after the Thirty was seriously threatened. ARISTOTLE, supra note
2, at 179 [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 119 [Xen. Hell. 2.3.14].
39 See, e.g., DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty killed the
Eleusians and Salaminians for siding with the exiles) [Diod. 14.32.4]; see also
LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148 (discussing the
massacres in Salamis and Eleusis generally) [Lys. 13.44]; LYSIAS, Against
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 126 (describing how three hundred
citizens in Salamis and Eleusis were condemned to death “by a collective vote”)
[Lys. 12.52].
40 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180–82 (discussing how opposing forces
gained strength as all Greeks joined their side) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.3, 40.2]; DIODORUS,
supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that exiles from around all of Greece flocked to the
Piraeus “to lay siege to the city”) [Diod. 14.33.4]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 159
(noting the diversity of men among the opposition forces) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.25].
41 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 179 (“The men from the city returned after
the battle, met in the Agora the next day, and deposed the Thirty and elected ten
citizens with full powers to bring the war to an end.”) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.1];
XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 157–59 (describing the process which led to the
37
38
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attack the city, the oligarchic leaders in the city asked Sparta to
send reinforcements. 42 The Spartans at first blockaded the Piraeus,
but then changed strategy and the Spartan commander Pausanias
negotiated a reconciliation agreement under which the democracy
was restored. 43
2.5. Forms of Collaboration
What were the crimes committed under the Thirty and who
committed them? Between September 404 and May 403 the Thirty
Tyrants executed approximately 1500 Athenians and drove out of
the city and confiscated the property of thousands more. 44 Those
bearing the most guilt for this violence were, of course, the senior
public officials: the Thirty themselves, plus the so-called Eleven,
who were the magistrates charged with carrying out executions.
However, responsibility was widespread, in part because of the
Thirty’s deliberate strategy of implicating others. 45 Members of the
Council sent countless innocents to their deaths. Some citizens
gave testimony that led to executions, often to save their own lives.
Other citizens arrested men and handed them over to the Eleven to
be killed without trial. Some of these citizens made these arrests
under threat of death and some made them on their own initiative.
deposition of the Thirty and the election of the ten, which consisted of one
member from each of the ten tribes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.23–24].
42 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 161 (detailing this request for assistance and
explaining Lysander’s plan to blockade the men in Piraeus by land and by sea in
order to induce a rapid surrender) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28].
43 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 161–71 (discussing the circumstances
ultimately leading to Pausanias’ change in strategy to restore democracy in
Athens) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28–43].
44 See AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 159, 244
(noting that more than fifteen hundred citizens were killed without trial) [Aesch.
3.235]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (detailing the widespread attacks on the
citizenry which resulted in more than fifteen hundred deaths) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.4];
DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that in addition to executing ordinary
citizens, the Thirty also killed wealthy citizens for their property and
appropriated the property of citizens who fled to protect themselves) [Diod.
14.5.6]; see also ISOCRATES, Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 182, 197
(contrasting the restraint of the exiles with the extensive violence of the Thirty)
[Isoc. 7.67].
45 See, e.g., PLATO, supra note 28, at 57 (“[W]hen the oligarchy came to power,
the Thirty summoned me and four others to the Rotunda and ordered us to bring
Leon from Salamis to be put to death.”) [Pl. Apol. 32c]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at
149 (describing how the Thirty forced the hoplites and cavalry of Eleusis to
condemn to death certain male Eleusian citizens so that they “may have the same
hopes and fears as [them]”) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9].
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The cavalry arrested the men of Eleusis, and the entire armed
forces voted to condemn them. More broadly, much of the
population stayed in the city and did not object during the unjust
judicial murders and massacres of hundreds of citizens without
trial. The overall picture is one of widespread collaboration, or at
least acquiescence, by the citizenry in mass violence orchestrated
by a small but highly intimidating leadership.
3.

“RECONCILIATION”

The Athenians remembered the reconciliation agreement as a
complete success, 46 an act of generosity and unity that set Athens
apart from other city-states. 47 One orator told the Athenian jury,
“the whole of Greece regards you as very generous and sensible
men, because you didn’t devote yourselves to revenge for the past,
but to the preservation of the city and the unity of its citizens.” 48
The reconciliation agreement was successful in the sense that
Athens avoided the widespread bloodshed that often accompanied
civil wars in other Greek states and established a stable democracy
that endured for the remainder of Athens’ history as an
independent state. But while Athenians on opposite sides of the
conflict found a way to live and govern together in the restored
democracy, our sources reveal that private, human resentment
over actions taken during the oligarchy remained strong for
decades after the end of the civil war.

46 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES 99, 137–38
(Michael Gagarin & Douglas M. MacDowell trans., 1998) (showing that the
Athenian reconciliation was regarded as a “satisfactory settlement of mutual
disagreements”) [Andoc. 1.140]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (discussing how
well the Athenians managed their affairs post-reconciliation) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.3];
ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104
(arguing that Athens exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil
strife) [Isoc. 18.31–32]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (recognizing that the
Athenians chose not to remember past grievances) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43].
47 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note
46, at 99, 137–38 (reaffirming the attitude of generosity and sensibility exhibited by
the Athenians following the reconciliation) [Andoc. 1.140]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea
Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104 (arguing that Athens
exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil strife) [Isoc. 18.31–32.].
48 ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at
99, 137 [Andoc. 1.140].
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3.1. The Terms of the Reconciliation Agreement
The terms of the reconciliation agreement were less a product
of generosity than of military necessity. Although the democrats
had gained the upper hand at the time of the settlement, the arrival
of Spartan forces to bolster the oligarchs threatened the democrats’
success. 49 Pausanias, the Spartan commander, presided over an
agreement that guaranteed the restoration of the democracy but
also treated the oligarchs and their supporters with relative
leniency.
The highest officials of the oligarchy—the Thirty, the Ten who
succeeded the Thirty, the Eleven who carried out executions, and
the governors of the Piraeus—were given the option of forfeiting
their Athenian citizenship to live autonomously in the village of
Eleusis with any of their supporters who wished to join them. 50
Remarkably, the agreement not only gave the former oligarchs
control over the village whose men they had massacred; it also
forced current inhabitants of Eleusis to sell their land if one of the
settlers wished to buy it. 51 This experiment in splitting Athens into
two autonomous settlements was short-lived: when the Athenians
learned two years later that the former oligarchs were hiring
mercenaries, the Athenians killed the opposing generals and
reintegrated Eleusis into a single Athenian state. 52
The top oligarchic officials who did not want to relocate to
Eleusis were permitted to remain in Athens provided they
underwent an euthuna, a trial-like accounting of their conduct in
office, and accepted any punishment meted out by the court. 53 The
accounting was not an extraordinary transitional justice institution
but the standard procedure faced by all outgoing officials under
the democracy both before and after the revolution. The only
adjustment made to the procedure was that the oligarchs were to
49 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (noting the difficulty caused by the
Spartan troops prior to the eventual success of the agreement) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43].
50 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180–81 (discussing the conditions
surrounding the option to move to Eleusis) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39–40.1].
51 See id. (relaying how land was transferred between settlers) [Ar. Ath. Pol.
39.3].
52 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (showing that the strategic hiring of
mercenaries by the oligarchs elicited a definitive response from the Athenians)
[Xen. Hell. 2.4.43].
53 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (discussing how members of the Thirty
and the Eleven and the ten governors of Peiraeus would be “immune from
prosecution once they had submitted to the euthuna”) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6].
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be judged not by a jury drawn from all adult male citizens but
from citizens with taxable property, 54 a form, as one scholar has
put it, of “loser’s justice.” 55 The procedure appears to have been as
even-handed in practice as advertised: at least one member of the
Thirty appears to have consented to, and passed, an accounting, 56
and the Constitution of the Athenians tells us that several of members
of the Board of Ten who ruled at the end of the oligarchy passed
their accountings. 57
Everyone below the top officials was granted amnesty under
the agreement. 58 The Assembly swore an oath, me mnesikakein,
which is sometimes translated as “not to remember past wrongs,”
but is more accurately (though less literally) translated as “not to
bear a grudge” or “to cancel past grievances.” 59 The amnesty
banned physical retaliation and lawsuits against those who
committed crimes during the oligarchy. Each year, the Council
swore not to accept summary arrests that violated the amnesty,
54 See id. (noting that the jury for the euthuna of the governors of Piraeus were
the citizens of Piraeus and the jury for the euthuna of the others who held office in
the city was limited to citizens with taxable property ) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6].
55 ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22.
56 See LYSIAS, Against Theomnestus for Defamation, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at
101, 110 (stating that someone brought a homicide charge against one or more
members of the Thirty in the year 399/398, which suggests that at least one
oligarch passed his accounting and remained in Athens) [Lys. 10.31]; see also
KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 122 (explaining that one scholar has argued that the
passages in Against Eratosthenes suggest that there was more than one defendant
at this accounting, however, as Krentz points out, “the plural references can be
understood as Lysias’ attempt to condemn by association”); LYSIAS, Against
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 115 (noting the prosecution speech at
the accounting of another member of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, survives although
the specific outcome of the accounting is unknown) [Lys. 12].
57 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180 (explaining how Rhinon and his friends,
members of the Board of Ten, passed their accounting under the democracy) [Ar.
Ath. Pol. 38.4].
58 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note
46, at 99, 137–38 (reiterating positive attitudes toward the reconciliation, as well as
the fact that all collaborators below the Thirty and the Eleven were granted total
amnesty) [Andoc. 1.140]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (recognizing that
complete amnesty was given to everyone except the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6].
59 See EDWIN CARAWAN, RHETORIC AND THE LAW OF DRACO 130–31 (1998)
(examining the use of the phrase in other Greek treaties and agreements); see also
NICOLE LORAUX, THE DIVIDED CITY: ON MEMORY AND FORGETTING IN ANCIENT
ATHENS 149–52 (2002) (interpreting me mnesikakein); David Cohen, The Rhetoric of
Justice: Strategies of Reconciliation and Revenge in the Restoration of Athenian
Democracy in 403 BC, 42 EUR. J. SOC. 335, 339 (2001) (noting that one of the possible
translations of me mnesikakein is “not to hold a grudge”).
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and jurors similarly swore to uphold the law and not to bear a
grudge for events under the Thirty. 60 The Amnesty had one
exception: charges of homicide and wounding for actions taken
during the oligarchy could proceed provided that the defendant
killed or wounded “with his own hand” (autocheir). 61 But this
exception, probably included for reasons of religious pollution,
had little practical effect. Nearly all of those responsible for
criminal violence committed during the civil war were shielded by
the Amnesty because the actual executions were committed by the
Board of Eleven, who were excluded from the Amnesty and all of
whom, presumably, fled to Eleusis or into exile after the
reconciliation. After the reintegration of Eleusis in 401/400, the
Amnesty was reaffirmed 62 to make clear that the terms of the
Amnesty extended to those who had relocated to Eleusis. 63
3.2. Implementation and Resistance
Aside from returning the land that had been confiscated, 64 the
reconciliation agreement offered little to those who had been

60 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note
46, at 99, 125 (describing the oath taken to grant amnesty for conduct which
occurred under the Thirty, and to permit the Thirty and the Eleven, the main
perpetrators, to remain in Athens, if they submitted to, and passed, an
examination of their conduct in office) [Andoc. 1.90–91].
61 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (noting the lack of amnesty given to
those who had killed another person with their own hands) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.5–6].
62 See id. (showing that the Amnesty was in effect prior to the fall of Eleusis)
[Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]; see also ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125 (supporting the conception that the Amnesty
was part of the reconciliation and that it was reaffirmed after the fall of Eleusis)
[Andoc. 1.90–91]. But see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (presenting a narrative
that supports the idea that the Amnesty was only instituted after the fall of
Eleusis) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. See generally LOENING, supra note 5, at 26–28
(discussing this reconciliation debate in greater detail).
63 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 122 (arguing that those in Eleusis excluded
from the Amnesty went into voluntary exile); LOENING, supra note 5, at 116–17
(noting that those in Eleusis who were excluded from the Amnesty, such as the
Thirty and the Eleven, presumably went into voluntary exile to escape
punishment). We are not aware of any member of the Thirty or the Eleven
returning to Athens after the fall of Eleusis.
64 See LYSIAS, Against Hippotherses, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 366, 368
(describing the complex rules in place under the reconciliation agreement
surrounding the return of confiscated real property as well as movables and
suggesting that payment would often have to be made for the recuperation of
confiscated property) [Lys. 7]; see also LOENING, supra note 5, at 51–52 (discussing
this property compensation process).
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victimized by the Thirty. Not surprisingly, some Athenians
resisted complying with the Amnesty. We are told of at least one
former informant who, though covered by the Amnesty, opted to
go into exile out of fear of retaliation. 65 And we hear of one man
who immediately violated the Amnesty, probably by taking
physical vengeance, 66 prompting one of Athens’ leaders to make an
example of him by having the Council execute him without trial. 67
Aristotle suggests that this measure successfully deterred those
intent on private vengeance. 68 Attempts to bring private suits in
violation of the Amnesty prompted the Athenians to create a new
procedure, the paragraphe, which allowed a defendant to challenge
the legality of a prosecution and imposed a financial penalty on the
prosecutor if the case was thrown out. 69 And we know of a few
attempts, at least one of which appears to have been successful, 70 to
use creative legal arguments to get around the Amnesty and hold
informants responsible for judicial murders committed under the
Thirty. 71 But despite some resistance, it appears that the Amnesty
was generally honored in the sense that there appears to have been
very little violent retaliation and very few prosecutions brought for
the thousands of confiscations, murders, and other crimes
committed under the Thirty. 72
See LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 74 (comparing
Andocides to an informer under the Thirty who may have been tracked down and
killed by his enemies in Athens) [Lys. 6.45].
66 See CARAWAN, supra note 59, at 130–31 (discussing an example where
Archinus arrested an unnamed citizen who violated the Amnesty and had him
put to death without trial).
67 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181–82 (stating that Archinus stopped some
of the returning democrats from killing their enemies) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.2]. Nepos
also states that Thrasybulus stopped some of the returning democrats from killing
their enemies. See CORNELIUS NEPOS, Thrasybulus, in CORNELIUS NEPOS 92, 99 (John
C. Rolfe trans., 1984) [Thrasyb. 3.3].
68 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (suggesting that the execution examples
prevented Athenians from taking both private and public revenge) [Ar. Ath. Pol.
40.2–3].
69 See ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2,
at 97, 97–98 (describing the introduction of the paragraphe as a measure to stop
prosecutions that violated the Amnesty) [Isoc. 18.2–3].
70 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 150–51 (stating
that the informer, Menestratus, was tried and condemned) [Lys. 13.55–57].
71 See id. at 150 (describing the successful prosecution of of Menestratus for
being an informer) [Lys. 13.55–57].
72 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (stating that the demos abided by its
oaths) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]; see also ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125–26 (stating that Meletus had immunity for his
65
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But was it that easy? Very seldom, and never before and after
in the ancient world, has a bloodletting so great been followed by
an amnesty so generous. What is striking about the amnesty is that
the Athenians stuck to it long after the Spartan threat receded and
despite the fact that many victims of the Thirty harbored
resentment decades later. 73 How did this happen?
4.

THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN RECONCILIATION

In this section, I explore how Athenian legal institutions
fostered reconciliation and a peaceful transition to democracy. I
argue that Athens’ unique legal and political culture permitted the
terms of the reconciliation agreement to be implemented in a way
that promoted unity and social solidarity while it also recognized
the need to avoid impunity for collaborators at the local or private
level. 74 First, in the generation following the war, speeches made
in the Athenian courts helped cultivate reconciliation by creating a
collective memory of the “misfortunes” 75 that downplayed the
extent of collaboration and extolled Athens for the generosity
embodied in the Amnesty. 76 Second, through the use of character
evidence in unrelated cases and challenges to incoming officials,
the Athenian courts provided some measure of individualized
accountability at the private level, while also encouraging former
arrest of Leon of Salamis due to the reconciliation) [Andoc. 1.94]; ISOCRATES,
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97, 102-03 (citing a
case in which the defendant presented no defense other than immunity, based on
the Amnesty, and was acquitted, and describing how two powerful individuals
refrained from bringing suit to recover money lost during the oligarchy because of
the amnesty) [Isoc. 18.22–23].
73 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 277 (challenging
a candidate to the archonship by referring to his conduct during the oligarchy)
[Lys. 26.13–15].
74 In this way, Athenian transitional justice mechanisms were not
epiphenomena but instead contributed to the success of the reconciliation. See
TEITEL, supra note 2, at 3–9 (arguing against the view that “[j]ustice seeking in
[modern transitional] periods is fully epiphenomenal and best explained in terms
of the balance of power”); see also Posner and Vermeule, supra note 3, at 770–77
(providing modern examples of transitional justice mechanisms “as causal factors
that may contribute to or undermine the success of a transition”).
75 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note
46, at 99, 137 (referring to the civil war obliquely as “the misfortunes”) [Andoc.
1.140].
76 Excellent discussions of how Athenian court rhetoric constructed a
collective memory of the civil war include WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 75–99 and
Cohen, supra note 59.
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collaborators to make a public proclamation of their allegiance to
the democracy.
Finally, the highly participatory nature of
Athenian civic institutions—not just courts, but also polis-wide
and local deliberative assemblies—helped repair local relationships
by forcing individuals on opposite sides of the conflict to work
closely together.
A few words of background on the Athenian court system may
be helpful here. 77 There were no lawyers or professional judges in
ancient Athens; with few exceptions, litigants were required to
deliver their own speeches to the jury. 78 Each Athenian litigant
was allotted a fixed amount of time to present his case. Although a
magistrate chosen by lot presided over each popular court, the
magistrate did not interrupt the speaker for any reason or permit
others to raise legal objections. The magistrate did not even
instruct the jury as to the laws relevant to the case. Cases in the
popular courts were heard by juries of adult male citizens chosen
by lot and generally ranged from 201 to 501 in size. A simple
majority vote of the jury, taken without deliberation, determined
the outcome of the trial. No reasons for the verdict were given,
and there was no provision for appeal.
Litigants regularly introduced evidence—such as character
evidence relating to the litigant’s military service or how he treated
his parents—that modern courts would deem irrelevant and/or
prejudicial. 79 Evidence of a litigant’s collaboration or resistance
during the civil war could influence jury verdicts in part because
Athenian jurors did not feel constrained to strictly apply the statute
under which a case was brought. 80 The treatment of law in the
surviving speeches is consistent with Aristotle’s characterization of
See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 31–40 (outlining the structure of the
Athenian legal system).
78 A litigant could donate some of his time to another speaker. For an indepth study of the use of supporting speakers in Athenian courts, see LENE
RUBINSTEIN, LITIGATION AND COOPERATION: SUPPORTING SPEAKERS IN THE COURTS OF
CLASSICAL ATHENS (2000).
79 See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (discussing extra-legal
arguments brought up in Athenian courts).
80 For a more detailed discussion, see generally id. Although others have
reached a similar conclusion, for example MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS
ATHENIAN 193–224 (1998) (“The laws are a splendid thing; but a man who looks
too closely to the laws is clearly a sykophant [sic].”) (quoting Menander). Some
disagree. See, e.g., P.J. Rhodes, Keeping to the Point, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN
ANCIENT GREECE 137 (Edward M. Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., 2004) (arguing
for a more qualified notion of relevance in Athenian litigation).
77
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laws as a form of evidence, similar to contracts and witness
testimony, rather than as a decisive guide to a verdict. 81 The
Athenian laws were inscribed on stone stelai in various public areas
of Athens. Litigants were responsible for finding and quoting any
laws they thought helped their case, though there was no
obligation to explain the relevant laws. Rather than focusing on
the elements of the particular charge at issue and applying them to
the facts of the case, Athenian litigants would sometimes cite an
array of laws that did not govern the charges in the case, 82 and on
occasion would not consider it relevant to discuss—or even
mention—the law under which the suit was brought. 83 In many
cases, the primary purpose of the relevant law may have been to
set out a procedure for bringing a case to court. The jury then
attempted to arrive at a just outcome for the broadly defined
dispute.
Before discussing the three mechanisms through which the
courts fostered reconciliation in more detail, I would like to
emphasize one broader point: the Athenian legal system was able
to perform these functions without any significant change in its
culture or design—a continuity that gave it a distinct advantage
over modern institutions charged with dispensing transitional
justice. The broad notion of relevance and the contextualized

81 See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 102 (George A.
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing five items—laws, witnesses,
contracts, tortures and oaths—that factor into judicial rhetoric) [Ar. Rhet. 1.15].
82 Speakers sometimes cited laws to bolster their portrayal of the character of
the parties. See, e.g., Michael de Brauw, “Listen to the Law Themselves”: Citations of
Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory, 97.2 CLASSICAL J. 161 (2001–2002)
(exploring the citation of law in Athens as a means to portray character). Speakers
also cited the law to give the general impression that the laws supported their
position. See, e.g., C. Carey, Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory, 116 J. HELLENIC
STUD. 33, 34 (1996) (arguing that litigants sometimes cite multiple law of
questionable relevance “to overwhelm the jury with a seemingly compelling array
of legal support”). Ford provides a case study of the use of law in Aeschines’
Against Timarchus. He notes that the discussion of the law at issue, which
accounts for only one-sixth of the speech (1.28–32), is surrounded by a number of
laws irrelevant to the charge but useful in constructing an image of the education
and moral character of a proper orator that can be contrasted with the record and
character of the speaker’s opponent. Andrew Ford, Reading Homer from the
Rostrum: Poems and Laws in Aeschines’ Against Timarchus, in PERFORMANCE
CULTURE AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 231, 241 (Simon Goldhill & Robin Osborne
eds., 1999).
83 See, e.g., LYSIAS, Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 296 (omitting
any citation to a law) [Lys. 30].
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approach to adjudication characteristic of Athenian courts 84 made
them a more effective forum for the creation of collective memory
than modern war crimes tribunals. In modern tribunals, the desire
of prosecutors or judges to use the trial to create a shared
understanding of the causes of ‘administrative massacres’—
atrocities perpetrated with the assistance of the modern
bureaucratic state—is inevitably constrained by the law’s narrow
focus on the conduct and responsibility of the individual
defendants. 85 Athenian court procedures, by contrast, could
comfortably accommodate these non-traditional goals. Moreover,
in the modern context, the creation of special transitional justice
procedures—whether they are courts, truth commissions, or
procedures for administrative penalties—inevitably raises
questions of legitimacy on two grounds. First, they are often
perceived to be politicized because they are ad hoc institutions
designed to address a specific political crisis. 86 Second, modern
transitional justice institutions subject individuals to procedures
and, on occasion, substantive legal standards that did not exist at
the time the prosecuted conduct occurred. 87 By contrast, Athens’
legal response to the atrocities of the Thirty utilized only preexisting democratic legal procedures precisely because these
procedures could accommodate transitional justice goals. In this
way, “transitional justice” in Athens was not a departure from but
rather an integral part of the restored democratic order.
Was Athenian legal culture the most important element in the
success of the reconciliation? It is impossible to prove definitively,
but it is worth pointing out that the other obvious, potential factors
cannot completely explain Athens’ peaceful transition. Political
See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (describing the use and
relevance of extra-legal arguments within the Athenian legal system).
85 See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 13 (2002) (“[T]he meaning of historical events often exceeds the
intentions or actions of particular individuals and can be grasped only by
attention to structural causes, . . . or a broad institutional logic through which the
actions by individuals create social effects.”); see also MINOW, supra note 1, at 46–47
(“[T]he focus on select individuals cannot tell the complex connections among
people that make massacres and genocides possible.”).
86 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 30–31 (describing the contemporary
criticisms of the International Tribunal’s actions during the Nuremberg trials).
87 See id. (discussing the problem of retroactivity at the Nuremberg, Bosnia
and Rwanda tribunals); see also TEITEL, supra note 2, at 11–26 (exploring the
meaning of “the rule of law” within societies undergoing political
transformation).
84
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scientists in the realist tradition often argue that transitional justice
measures are epiphenomenal, and that successful reconciliations
can be traced to equilibrium between well-balanced opposing
forces. This explanation does not work for the Athenian case. It is
true that the initial settlement emerged from a stalemate between
the rebels and the Spartan-backed oligarchs. However, once the
settlement had been made the Spartans quickly made their exit.
There was no balance of power; the democrats were firmly in
control and in a position to exact harsh retribution on the former
oligarchs if they had chosen to do so. Moreover, the picture that
emerges of postwar Athens is not of two opposing factions in
equipoise, but rather of a united restored democracy in which a
fair number of former oligarchs played an active role. In addition,
although Athens faced dire economic and military danger after the
loss of its empire and could not afford continued internal strife,88
Thucydides provides examples of other cities in the grip of civil
war who failed to act rationally, cities for whom, in his words,
“[r]evenge was more important than self-preservation.”89
Similarly, the absence of racial or ethnic differences between the
factions does distinguish Athens from many modern transitions,
but it does not explain why Athens was more successful than
other, similarly ethnically homogenous, Greek city-states that also
experienced civil wars. Finally, some scholars argue that the
constitutional reforms at the end of the fifth century removed the
basis for oligarchic discontent. 90 But there is no question that, at
least in intellectual circles, many people—Plato being the most
prominent example—remained dissatisfied with the democracy
and were attracted to oligarchic forms of government.
While we cannot determine precisely how much of Athens’
success can be attributed to the discourse in the courts, we do
know that Athens was nearly alone in avoiding the cycle of
retribution that afflicted other city-states during and after the
Peloponnesian War. We also know that its legal system was very
88 See, e.g., OBER, supra note 2, at 98–100 (describing the dire economic and
political situation in Athens after the war).
89 See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 209 (Rex Warner
trans., Penguin Books 1954) (discussing the deterioration of law and order in favor
of revenge and greed during the revolution in Corcyra) [Thuc. 3.82].
90 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 3, at 14–15 (describing a provision in the
reformed constitution which promoted democratic procedures by prohibiting the
use of laws not included within the written code and requiring proposed
revisions to the law to pass a series of discussions before the Assembly).
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different from any other city-state, indeed different from just about
any other legal system the world has known. Thus it seems
worthwhile to try to identify aspects of the legal system in Athens
that may have produced this extraordinary outcome.
4.1. Courts and Collective Memory
Legal procedures following administrative massacres can
influence the society’s “collective memory” of these events, that is,
the community’s shared understanding of the extent and
reprehensibility of the atrocities and the relative culpability of the
different actors. 91 Trials can serve as legal rituals, which, in the
words of David Garland, “provide a kind of didactic theatre
through which the onlooker is taught what to feel, how to react,
[and] which sentiments are called for.” 92 While there is no
blueprint for designing transitional justice institutions that will
positively influence collective memory, the twentieth century
offers some success stories. 93 In Western Europe, for example, it
has been found that the collective memory of the Holocaust
(judged from opinion surveys and textbooks) is weakest and least
accurate in those countries that conducted few or no postwar trials
of collaborators. 94 It is important to note that a society’s collective
memory need not be historically “accurate” to generate social
solidarity; the siege of Masada and the denial of extensive French
collaboration during World War II are examples of shared
historical fictions that are thought to have fostered solidarity. 95
91 See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 2
(1997) (“Trials of those responsible for large-scale state brutality . . . indelibly
influence collective memory of the events they judge.”); TEITEL, supra note 2
(exploring how “transitional accountings” helps construct a state’s political
identity); Koskenniemi, supra note 85, at 12 (describing how past “normality” is
politicized when seeking transitional justice).
92 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 67 (1990) (emphasis
added); see also OSIEL, supra note 91, at 2 (“By highlighting official brutality and
public complicity . . . trials often make people willing to reassess their
foundational beliefs and constitutive commitments, as few events in political life
can do.”).
93 See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 59–239 (describing the positive impact of
transitional justice institutions in Germany and Japan and identifying the effective
and ineffective components of the respective institutions).
94 Id. at 229 (noting that the countries with the weakest collective memories—
Austria, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands—did not conduct significant postwar
trials).
95 Id. at 234 (describing the re-characterization of the siege of Masada as a
means of creating a unified collective memory in Israel).
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Similarly, we will see that the shared memory of the reign of the
Thirty tyrants constructed in Athenian court discourse helped
foster unity by denying the true extent of collaboration and by
depicting the Amnesty as a gesture of pure benevolence rather
than a deal struck between evenly-matched forces. 96
Despite the Amnesty, the reign of the Thirty was discussed
frequently in Athenian courts in the generation after the civil war.
At least one member of the Thirty, and several members of the Ten,
underwent accountings (euthunai) in court and the prosecution
speech against Eratosthenes, a member of the Thirty, still
survives. 97 Allegations of wrongdoing during the oligarchy arose
frequently in examinations of incoming public officials (dokimasia);
portions of two prosecution speeches and two defense speeches at
these hearings have survived. 98 We also have speeches involving
two prosecutions that appear to have violated the Amnesty: the
prosecution of an informer for homicide, and the paragraphe speech
challenging the legality of a private suit under the Amnesty which
attempted to recoup money confiscated during the oligarchy. 99 In
addition to trials that centered on events during the civil war,

96 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 348 (“In Athens, after the restoration,
democratic politicians realized the uses to which critiques of oligarchy could be
put and were quick to occupy the high ground of the rule of law by appropriating
its rhetoric for their cause.”); WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 75 (“Through civic
discourse, [the Athenians] distanced themselves from the Thirty while
simultaneously constructing a continuity with the democracy of the fifth
century.”).
97 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113 (accusing
Eratosthenes of the murder of Lysias’ brother Polemarchus) [Lys. 12].
98 The prosecution speeches are: LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra
note 6, at 271 (challenging Euandrus at his dokimasia for the archonship based on
his conduct during the civil war) [Lys. 26]; LYSIAS, Against Philon, in LYSIAS, supra
note 6, at 308 (challenging the candidature of Philon to the Council of Five
Hundred) [Lys. 31]. The defense speeches are: LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS,
supra note 6, at 177 (defending the candidate against accusations of having served
in the cavalry under the Thirty during a dokimasia) [Lys. 16]; LYSIAS, For
Eryximachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 378 (defending Eryximachus against the
allegation that he supported the Thirty during the civil war) [Fr. 9 For
Eryximachus].
99 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137 (prosecuting an
informer, Agoratus, for murders committed under the Thirty) [Lys. 13]; ISOCRATES,
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96 (offering the first
special plea, in which the speaker defends himself against the admissibility of the
prosecutors charge, in Athenian history) [Isoc. 18].
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several court speeches discuss the reign of the Thirty, the Amnesty,
or the conduct of litigants during the oligarchy. 100
Of course, the courts were not the only forum for constructing
collective memory. War memorials erected after the restoration of
the democracy and funeral orations honoring the war’s dead (and
praising Athens’ superior character and form of government),
which were delivered annually when Athens was at war, also
contributed to Athens’ shared understanding of the tyranny and
the Amnesty. 101 Despite the importance of drama and the arts in
many modern post-conflict societies, Athenian drama was most
likely less significant in post-war Athens. From early on, tragedies
were almost always set outside Athens and were often concerned
with mythological themes. When Athenian tragedy did address
contemporary politics, it only did so obliquely and ambiguously.
Though comedies in the fifth century, such as those of
Aristophanes, often parodied issues of the day, by the fourth
century—the age of “middle comedy”—comic subjects had turned
from political commentary to domestic life. In any case, no forum
could rival the courts as a medium of collective discourse
regarding the civil war: these courts met approximately 200 times a
year; 102 the importance of character evidence made discussion of
100 See, e.g., ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra
note 46, at 99, 137 (praising the jury for focusing on preserving the city and unity
among its citizens) [Andoc. 1.140]; LYSIAS, On the Property of Nicias’ Brother, supra
note 6, at 195 (discussing the actions of Diognetus during the reign of the Thirty)
[Lys. 18.10]; LYSIAS, For the Disabled Man, in LYSIAS, supra note 6 (denying
accusations relating to the defendant’s conduct during the civil war in an effort to
receive a disability pension) [Lys. 24]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 265 (discussing how the litigant did not take advantage of
the chaos and punish his enemies or attempt to advantage his friends during the
city’s defeat) [Lys. 25.15]; LYSIAS, Against Ergocles, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 291
(challenging the defendant on his actions while in office) [Lys. 28.12]; LYSIAS,
Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 301 (discussing political intrigues
that were aided by laws the defendant produced) [Lys. 30.12]; Plato, supra note 28,
at 57 (describing the oligarchy under the Thirty) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d].
101 See WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 87–90 (discussing the functions of war
memorials in Athens and how certain war memorials became symbols of the
Athenian democracy). The only surviving epitaphios from the immediate
postwar period is Lysias 2, which does praise the Athenians’ decision to forgo
punishment in favor of unity. LYSIAS, Funeral Speech, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 38–
39 [Lys. 2.60–65]. For a brilliant study of how funeral orations helped construct a
semi-official (and misleading) history of Athens, see NICOLE LORAUX, THE
INVENTION OF ATHENS (1986).
102 See MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
DEMOSTHENES: STRUCTURE, PRINCIPLES, AND IDEOLOGY 186 (J.A. Crook trans., Univ.
of Okla. 1999) (noting that the courts met approximately 200 times per year).
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the civil war likely in cases tried in the postwar period; 103 and
hundreds of jurors were present at each case.
The discourse in the courts fostered reconciliation in three
ways, which I will discuss in turn: (1) discrediting the oligarchy by
depicting the horrors of the tyranny; (2) constructing unity by
downplaying the extent of collaboration and focusing blame on the
Thirty; and (3) praising the Amnesty as characteristic of the
Athenians’ unusual wisdom and benevolence. 104
4.1.1.

Discrediting the Oligarchy

Athenian trials publicized the crimes committed by the Thirty,
thereby discrediting the former regime. The broad notion of
evidence in Athenian courts permitted prosecutors to reach
beyond the specific charges against the defendant to describe the
larger pattern of tyranny. For example, the prosecution of an
informant whose testimony led to a judicial murder early in the
Thirty’s reign, includes discussion of atrocities that did not involve
the defendant and were committed after the events in question,
including the massacres of Salamis and Eleusis, unjust arrests and
executions, confiscations of property, and the expulsion of all but
the 3000 from the city. 105 The trial at Eratosthenes’ accounting
provides another example. The prosecution speech includes a
detailed and poignant description of the murder of the speaker’s
brother in the massacre of the resident aliens that emphasizes the
outrageousness of the Thirty, who had the audacity to rip the
earrings directly from the ears of the victim’s wife and refused to
let the family have one of the victim’s cloaks to give him a proper
burial. 106 But the speech also includes a detailed account of how

103 See LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (discussing the use and influence of
character evidence in cases heard in post war Athenian courts).
104 See WOLPERT, supra note 5 (analyzing the discussions of the civil war by
court speakers and noting the rhetorical strategies discussed in this Section);
Cohen, supra note 59 (discussing the rhetorical strategies employed in courts to
foster reconciliation).
105 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148–49
(describing the disasters that befell Athens after Agoratus killed the men who
went to the Council’s chamber to face trial) [Lys. 13.43–48].
106 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 119 (noting
that the Thirty’s administration of justice toward Polemarchus began with a
summary arrest and instructions to drink hemlock and ended with the denial of a
customary burial) [Lys. 12.17–19].
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the oligarchy came to power 107 and a recitation of the collective
crimes of the Thirty. 108 While the speaker opines that many
prosecutors would be required to describe all the crimes of the
Thirty, 109 the speech does manage to provide a broad-ranging
account of the crimes committed under the oligarchy and an
assessment of where the primary responsibility should lie.
These public airings in court of the oligarchy’s horrific crimes
helped discredit not only the former regime, but also oligarchic
opposition to the democracy more generally. 110 The repressive rule
of the Thirty, with its rigged trials and extra-judicial murders,
made it easy for democrats to associate oligarchy with lawless
tyranny. Although oligarchic sympathies survived and even
thrived in elite intellectual circles in the fourth century, 111 oligarchy
became a political non-starter after the civil war. As Cohen points
out, decades later even those too young to have been involved in
the Thirty could be tarred with accusations of having oligarchic
tendencies. 112 The prosecutor in an assault case derides his
opponent: “Even if he is younger than those who held power then
[i.e., under the oligarchy], he has the character of that government.
These were the natures that betrayed our empire to the enemy,
razed the walls of our homeland, and executed fifteen hundred of
our citizens without trial.” 113
4.1.2.

Constructing Unity

Like many modern transitional justice legal procedures, then,
Athenian trials helped to instill a shared sense of condemnation of
the crimes committed by the former regime. But while many
107 See id. at 130–31 (describing Theramenes’ political strategy for depriving
the people of hope in order to overpower them) [Lys. 12.70].
108 See id. at 135 (calling for a display of anger for the crimes committed by
the Thirty) [Lys. 12. 95–96].
109 See id. at 136 (closing the argument in the prosecution speech against
Eratosthenes, a former member of the Thirty, and calling for a favorable verdict)
[Lys. 12.99].
110 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 347–49 (discussing the methods used to
discredit the oligarchy).
111 Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle are prominent examples.
112 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 347–49 (discussing the accusations placed
upon those who lived under the oligarchy even where they had no direct role in
its rule).
113 ISOCRATES, Against Lochites, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 123, 126 [Isoc.
20.10–11]; see also Cohen, supra note 59, at 349 (discussing the lasting taint of the
oligarchy on those who lived under its rule).
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modern tribunals or truth commissions seek in part to encourage
the broader public to engage in self-scrutiny and confront their
own complicity, 114 Athenian court speakers did nothing of the
kind. In the decades after the civil war, litigants who discussed the
violence under the oligarchy took pains to focus blame narrowly
on the Thirty while downplaying the extent of collaboration. This
understanding of events was quite explicit in the speeches. To cite
one stark example: in discussing the massacre of the metics
(resident aliens) at the accounting of Eratosthenes, the prosecutor
states, “[t]he rest of the Athenians [i.e. those not in the Thirty], it
seems to me, could have a plausible excuse for what happened by
laying the blame on the Thirty . . . .” 115 Both defendants and
prosecutors in suits involving participation in the crimes of the
oligarchy take this approach, depicting the entire citizenry as
opponents and victims of the Thirty. 116 Undoubtedly the speakers
(and their speechwriters) chose this tack because they thought that
it would be well received by the jurors. But the effect of this
rhetorical strategy was to help construct a misleading collective
memory of a unified populace victimized by the tyrannical Thirty.
Lysias’ depiction in the accounting trial of Eratosthenes of the
process by which the Thirty came to power provides an example.
His narrative places blame squarely on Theramenes, a member of
the Thirty, and minimizes the role of the Athenians who did, after
all, vote the Thirty into office. 117 Lysias’ account of the Assembly
meeting minimizes the citizens’ responsibility as much as possible:
he states that many in the Assembly initially opposed the proposal,
and even after the Spartan general threatened to destroy Athens if
they did not acquiesce, some Athenians got up and left the

114 See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 192–95 (discussing the trial of Auschwitz
guards, which seems to have had this effect, and the 1983 junta trial in Argentina,
which also seems to have been premised on this idea, but was less successful).
115 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 121 [Lys.
12.28].
116 See id. at 121 (addressing the jurors as victims of the Thirty) [Lys. 12.30];
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274–78 (illustrating how
the prosecutors depicted the entire citizenry as the victims of the Thirty in the
trials of Euandrus) [Lys. 26.1–16]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in
ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97 (assuming all the juries had been in Piraeus rather
than the city) [Isoc. 18.2].
117 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 130–31
(chronicling the Thirty’s rise to power beginning with Theramenes’ demand that
the city be entrusted to the control of thirty men) [Lys. 12.70–75].
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Assembly, others stayed but remained silent, and only a “few evilminded scoundrels voted the proposal through.” 118
Perhaps most striking is the historical fiction, employed in
several speeches, that every member of the jury was a member of
the resistance in the Piraeus and/or a direct victim of the Thirty.
As several scholars have pointed out, although most jury panels
must have included members of the 3000 and other types of
collaborators, speakers regularly address the jury as former men of
the Piraeus, and describe how the jurors, addressed as “you,” were
driven out of the city, had their property confiscated, houses
invaded and family members taken, took part in freeing the city,
and returned from the Piraeus. 119
A rare exception is a passage in Lysias’ prosecution of
Eratosthenes at his accounting, in which he briefly addresses
“those from the city (astu)” and “those from the Piraeus”
separately. But even this passage has a unifying message. Lysias
depicts the men who remained in the city as innocent victims
forced to fight against their own kin: “you who are from the town
should realize that the defendants ruled you so badly that you
were compelled to fight a war against your brothers, your sons,
and your fellow-citizens . . . .” 120 The prosecutor goes on to
emphasize that the former men of the city have gone from being
slaves of the oligarchy and their Spartan garrison to participating
in governing the polis and joining with the democrats to protect it
from external threats:

Id. at 131 [Lys. 12.75].
For prosecutors’ attempts to persuade juries that the defendants were the
victims of the crimes committed by the Thirty, see id. at 121, 127 [Lys. 12.30, 57],
LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148–49 [Lys. 13.47], and
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274 [Lys. 26.2]. See also
ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99,
122 (addressing the jury as if they were all direct opponents of the Thirty’s rule
and direct participants in the restoration of democracy) [Andoc. 1.81]; ISOCRATES,
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 97 (assuming
that the entire jury had been in exile in the Piraeus) [Isoc. 18.2]; WOLPERT, supra
note 5, at 90–94 (describing why speakers address the jury as though they had all
been in the Piraeus); Cohen, supra note 59, at 341 (discussing the nature of the
prosecutions of those who had collaborated with the Thirty).
120 LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.92].
See also ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in Isocrates I, supra note 2, at
101, 101–02 (emphasizing that while some citizens participated in arrests and
property confiscations they did so only out of compulsion) [Isoc. 18.17].
118
119
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Realize that you were ruled by the defendants, who were
the worst of men; realize too that you now share the
government with good men, you are fighting against
external enemies, and you are taking counsel for the city;
and remember the mercenaries [i.e., the Spartan garrison
employed by the Thirty] that the defendants established on
the Acropolis as guardians of their power and of your
slavery. 121
One speaker goes so far as to state that the men who did not
actively participate in the killings but remained in the city can
claim credit for the overthrow of the oligarchy, suggesting,
contrary to our historical evidence, that victory was secured by
widespread political opposition within the city. 122 To be sure, the
use of these rhetorical topoi in court did not erase individual
victims’ resentment against specific collaborators who had done
them harm. But the collective memory of the oligarchy constructed
in the courts may have made victims more willing to trust men
whose level of active collaboration was minimal or unknown to
them. For those who had remained in the city, the discourse in the
courts offered a rationalization for past collaboration and provided
comfort that there was a place for them in the restored democracy.
4.1.3.

Praising Amnesty

Finally, court speeches in the years after the civil war helped
create a myth in which the Amnesty, and the forgiveness that it
implied, exemplified the Athenians’ superior character. To be sure,
defendants accused of collaboration often defend the Amnesty on
pragmatic grounds, arguing that taking retribution would
endanger the democracy by alienating former oligarchs. 123 But

LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.94].
See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 278–79
(attributing the defeat of the Thirty to the people) [Lys. 26.18–19].
123 See ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 128 (noting the importance of the jurors’
decisions in creating precedents for which laws and customs will be followed by
the public) [Andoc. 1.105]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES
I, supra note 2, at 96, 106 (arguing that if amnesty is destroyed then civil strife will
result) [Isoc. 18.44]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 6,
at 260, 262–68 (speaking in defense of his right to hold public office and arguing
that the jury should be wary of alienating citizens with accusations of misdeeds
during the civil war) [Lys. 25.1–28]; James M. Quillin, Achieving Amnesty: The Role
of Events, Institutions, and Ideas, 132 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 71
121
122
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speakers also praise the Amnesty in a way that made a powerful
appeal to the Athenians’ honor. In these passages, the Amnesty is
transformed from a concession made out of military necessity to an
act of will that defines the Athenian democratic spirit. 124 Speakers
argue that the Athenians’ willingness to reject revenge earned
them a reputation throughout Greece for extraordinary generosity,
reasonableness, and wisdom. 125 Under this re-imagining, the
Amnesty was not a reminder of the darkest period in Athenian
history, but rather the manifestation of one its high points, worthy
of celebration. The speaker in Isocrates 18 states:
[W]hile our ancestors accomplished many noble things, the
city has won renown not least from these settlements. You
can find many cities that have fought nobly in war, but no
one could point to a city better advised with regard to civil
strife (stasis). Moreover, of those activities that carry risk,
one might ascribe the greatest part to luck, but no one
would attribute the credit for our moderation to anything
other than our intelligence. 126
We can see evidence that this identification as a democracy
with moderation took root: in the fourth century authors refer to
the Athenians’ characteristic mildness or forbearance in contexts
unrelated to the civil war. 127 Again, it is difficult to imagine that
(2002) (arguing that the surprising leniency toward former oligarchs was rational
because it appeased former oligarchs and prevented unrest).
124 See AESCHINES, On the Embassy, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 88, 156
(stating that because of the Amnesty “the world thought our city exceptionally
wise”) [Aesch. 2.176]; ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES,
supra note 46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians’ wisdom in refraining from
taking revenge on those who lived under the Thirty’s rule and arguing that the
public’s unified vote would determine whether they would rely on the laws of
Athens or find other means to escape their accusers) [Andoc. 1.140]; Cohen, supra
note 59, at 354–55 (noting that the portrayal of reconciliation helped unify the
polis over its enemies); ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I,
supra note 2, at 96, 102, 104 (praising Athenians for their moderation and wisdom
in dealing with civil strife) [Isoc. 18.22, 31–32].
125 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note
46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians as generous and sensible for not seeking
revenge) [Andoc. 1.140]; AESCHINES, On the Embassy, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at
88, 156 (noting that the success of the Amnesty earned the Athenians a worldwide reputation for wisdom) [Aesch. 2.176].
126 ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at
96, 104 [Isoc. 18.31–32].
127 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 165 (discussing how within the
customary forbearance of the Athenian democracy, only those who had

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/3

LANNI.DOC

2010]

1/13/2011 6:45 PM

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ATHENS

583

these encomia of the Amnesty could induce victims to forgive
individuals directly responsible for the murder of their kin.
Nevertheless, the Amnesty—which was reaffirmed by collective
oath each year by jurors and members of the Council and was
widely praised in court speeches—may have had some expressive
effect, encouraging the Athenians to live up to their myths and
take a more conciliatory attitude toward former collaborators who
did not personally cause them harm.
4.2. Courts and Indirect Accountability
A recurring theme in studies of modern transitions is that
many victims seem to get more satisfaction from the punishment
or acknowledgment of guilt by local perpetrators, as distinguished
from broad-ranging investigations of wrongdoing or trials of highlevel war criminals. 128 A common complaint among modern
victims is repeatedly seeing neighbors, co-workers, and fellowvillagers who collaborated in atrocities going about their lives as if
nothing had happened. 129 Due to the fact that Athenian victims
committed crimes during civil unrest were not allowed to live in Athens) [Ar. Ath.
Pol. 22.4]; LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 71–72 (referring
to the Athenians’ “gentleness” with regard to criminal prosecution) [Lys. 6.34].
See Margaretha DeBrunner Hall, Even Dogs have Erinyes: Sanctions in Athenian
Practice and Thinking, in GREEK LAW IN ITS POLITICAL SETTING 73, 88–89 (L. Foxhall &
A.D.E. Lewis eds., 1996) (discussing the Athenians’ reputation for mildness and
arguing that this reputation was largely undeserved).
128 See, e.g., Anita Isaacs, Truth and the Challenge of Reconciliation in Guatemala,
in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 116, 136–39
(Joanna Quinn ed., 2009) (discussing the importance of informal
acknowledgements to local communities in righting wrongs); Eric Stover,
Witnesses and the Promise of Justice in the Hague, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY:
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 104, 107 (Eric Stover
& Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004) (describing the feeling of dissatisfaction
experienced by witnesses who felt that their work would not be complete until
they testified against local war criminals). This insight is also part of the impetus
behind the gacaca courts in Rwanda. See generally Urusaro Karekezi, Alphonse
Nshimiyimana, & Beth Mutamba, Localizing Justice: Gacaca Courts in Post-genocide
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH
OF MASS ATROCITY 69, 69–84 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004)
(discussing the use of gacaca courts which allow local communities to bring
charges against genocide suspects who allegedly committed atrocities in said
communities).
129 See Dmitri A. Sotiropoulos, Swift Gradualism and Variable Outcomes: Vetting
in Post-Authoritarian Greece, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 121 (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds.,
2007) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS PREVENTION] (telling the story of a former member of
the resistance who had been imprisoned under military rule and who on the way
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could indirectly sanction collaborators for their conduct during the
oligarchy, the Athenians were able to minimize this “impunity
gap” at the local level, while still maintaining the unifying
collective narrative of rejecting vengeance for Amnesty. In this
way, the courts fostered reconciliation by offering some
accountability as a safety valve for local resentments based on
crimes committed during the reign of the Thirty.
Collaboration could be raised in court, without violating the
terms of the Amnesty, in two forms: (1) as character evidence in an
unrelated public or private lawsuit; and (2) in the dokimasia, the
examination of incoming magistrates. Where collaboration was
introduced in an unrelated lawsuit, it was up to the individual jury
to determine how much weight to accord this character evidence in
reaching its verdict. At the accounting, anyone who wished could
challenge a candidate for any reason, including collaboration. If
rejected by the jury, the only penalty was disqualification for office.
The accounting procedure shares some similarities with modern
forms of administrative justice, such as de-Nazification in
Germany and lustration in post-Communist Europe. In all three
contexts, those who were affiliated with or participated in the
former regime could be barred from public office and/or public
employment. 130
Athens’ indirect accountability mechanisms reduced victims’
worries about impunity, but did not go so far as to alienate former
collaborators by doling out severe sanctions. Most citizens were
likely to be selected by lot for office or to face litigation at some
point in their lives, 131 leaving them vulnerable to attacks based on
their conduct during the oligarchy. However, this mechanism was
to work, passed by the judge who convicted him sitting in a coffee shop every
morning, and of another resistance member who had been tortured learning that
his torturer had become the chief of police). For similar stories, see Isaacs, supra
note 128, at 136, which shows that victims in Guatemala lived near informants or
executioners, and TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND 321 (1996), which
illustrates how Stasi informants were banned from holding public sector jobs for
fifteen years.
130 See TEITEL, supra note 2, at 149–90 (discussing the use and forms of
administrative justice during periods of political transformation). See generally
JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 129 (discussing various vetting procedures
where members of old regimes were prevented from participating in newly
formed governments or public positions).
131 See Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 691, 693 (2009) (discussing both the collaborative and contentious
environment Athenian citizens faced).
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self-limiting in that collaboration only became an issue in court if a
victim or an enemy brought it up. Victims who needed to air their
grievances against a particular collaborator were given the
opportunity to do so, but there was no attempt to systematically
stigmatize or exclude from office all those who participated in the
oligarchy.
The uncertainty over whether and when former collaborators
in one’s village would face punishment through these indirect
mechanisms was much less troubling for those seeking retribution
in the context of a society that believed in divine sanctions. Divine
sanctions were uncertain and unpredictable, and could occur years
or even generations after a violation. 132 Even the awareness that
those who had participated in the oligarchy might face indirect
sanctions in court at some later time may have tempered victims’
perception of impunity. 133
At the same time, these potential indirect sanctions were not so
severe that they risked permanently alienating former
collaborators. For one thing, the only penalty that attached to
being rejected at one’s accounting was disqualification from office.
Men who were disqualified in this way could still participate fully
in the Assembly and the law courts. 134 Moreover, participation
under the Thirty did not doom a litigant or prospective magistrate;
this evidence was merely one factor in the jury’s consideration. 135
One man, challenged at his dokimasia because he was a member of
the Council and the cavalry under the Thirty, nevertheless appears
to have been confirmed as an archon, one of the highest offices of

132 See Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 LAW & HIST. REV.
469, 475 (2008) (discussing the Athenian belief in punishment from the gods).
133 Of course, a lack of apology or recognition of guilt on the part of the
perpetrators might diminish victims’ satisfaction.
The limited sense of
accountability provided by the Athenian procedures was more acceptable to
victims in part because the oligarchic sympathizers who were most likely to draw
retaliation probably opted to resettle in Eleusis. See ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22–23,
who points out that by the time some of those settlers returned to Athens after the
fall of Eleusis in 401 BC, retributive emotions had some time to diminish.
134 The one exception was that those who were convicted under the dokimasia
ton rhetoron were rendered ineligible to speak in the Assembly.
135 See LYSIAS, For Polystratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 217, 219–27 (defending
Polystratus successfully against loss of his rights as a citizen despite charges of
oligarchic sympathies) [Lys. 20]; LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at
177, 181 (giving another example of a man being confirmed in office despite
challenges at the dokimasia) [Lys. 16.9].
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the democracy. 136 Another court speaker suggests that many
cavalry members under the oligarchy went on to serve in the
Council and even as generals. 137
Perhaps most importantly, wide-ranging examination of
litigants’ and prospective magistrates’ character was routine in
Athenian courts. Defendants would not experience discussion of
their conduct under the oligarchy and any resulting indirect
sanctions as a specific attack aimed at former collaborators, but as
standard operating procedure in court. In fact, one defendant in a
dokimasia claims that he is glad to have the opportunity to refute
widespread accusations that he served in the cavalry under the
Thirty:
The people who force those who are unjustly accused to
undergo an investigation of their life’s record are in my
view responsible for great benefits. I am so utterly
confident in myself that I expect even someone badly
disposed toward me to change his mind when he hears me
speak about what happened and to think much better of me
in the future. 138
Like many modern vetting procedures, such as lustration, the
examination of an individual’s conduct under the previous regime
in the accounting was both backward- and forward-looking. 139
Disqualification from office was both a sanction for past
136 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 273 (discussing
the unsuccessful prosecution of Euandrus who later served as an archon) [Lys.
26].
137 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (stating that
several cavalry members under the oligarchy went on to hold high offices) [Lys.
16.8].
138 Id. at 179–80 [Lys. 16.1–3]. Of course, litigants were vulnerable to
completely fabricated accusations of collaboration, just as they could face false
accusations of all sorts of violations of legal and social norms in court. This
problem was at least reduced by the availability of suits for false witness and the
likelihood that someone among the hundreds of jurors or spectators might have
knowledge of the facts and shout down the speaker.
139 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing Czechoslovakia’s use of
lustration to bar former state security personnel from a wide variety of jobs). See
generally JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 129 (discussing various vetting
measures including lustration). See CHRISTIANE WILKE, The Shield, the Sword and the
Party: Vetting the East German Public Sector, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note
129, at 348, 349 (observing that even when the stated purpose of modern vetting
procedures is a forward-looking one, such as in East Germany, the social
understanding of these procedures is often as a backward-looking sanction).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/3

LANNI.DOC

2010]

1/13/2011 6:45 PM

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ATHENS

587

wrongdoing and a safeguard to prevent those who committed
crimes or who had oligarchic sympathies from exercising power in
the restored democracy.
But unlike most modern vetting
procedures, the accounting was as concerned with a candidate’s
current political commitments and view of the Thirty as with his
past conduct under the former regime. Wolpert points out that the
accounting served in part as a ritual in which former collaborators
publicly pledged their allegiance to the democratic constitution. 140
This does not mean that former collaborators expressed remorse or
even admitted participation in the oligarchy — in our surviving
speeches, litigants and prospective magistrates accused of
collaboration vehemently deny that they held offices under the
Thirty — or were in any way involved in the crimes committed by
the regime. 141 Due to the fact that very few magistrates exercised
significant individual power, the importance of the dokimasia to the
security of the democracy lay less in accurately ferreting out and
excluding from office those with oligarchic sympathies and more
in the symbolism of these hearings. Having passed a dokimasia, a
former collaborator might gain a sense of membership and
belonging under the new regime, and resentment at a
collaborators’ holding office might be eased by his public
repudiation of the oligarchy. Conversely, rejecting a candidate
allowed the demos to make a statement about the sort of
collaboration that it deemed incompatible with full citizenship.
In sum, the indirect sanctions for collaboration made possible
by the Athenians’ distinctive legal culture ranged far wider than
any direct trials of collaborators could possibly have done. These
mechanisms encouraged reconciliation by minimizing the
resentment created by the sense that local collaborators enjoyed
impunity and by offering a procedure whereby those with

140 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 180 (declaring
Mantitheus’s loyalty to the current Athenian Constitution) [Lys. 16.3]; WOLPERT,
supra note 5, at 115–16 (discussing the “suspension of belief” Athenian juries
exercised in hearing testimony from former collaborators in which they denied
any wrongdoing and declared their current allegiance).
141 E.g., LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (denying
any wrongdoing) [Lys. 16.8]; LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 260, 265 (denying criminal conduct during the oligarchy)
[Lys. 25.15–16]; LYSIAS, For Eryximachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 378, 381
(asserting his innocence under the rule of the Thirty) [Lys. Fr. 9.110]; PLATO, supra
note 28, at 57 (denying participation in the crimes of the Thirty, specifically the
arrest of Leon of Salamis) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d].
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questionable pasts could be publicly reintegrated into the
community.
4.3. Participation and Social Repair
Scholars who study conflict resolution and transitional justice
often rely on the “contact hypothesis,” the assumption that
“tension and hostility between [opposing] groups will be reduced
when these groups are brought in systematic contact with each
other.” 142 Athens’ highly participatory civic institutions may have
helped foster reconciliation by encouraging members on opposite
sides of the civil war to work together in a variety of contexts.
Jury service in the courts was just one of the many
opportunities for men of the city and men of the Piraeus to interact
productively after the civil war. Other venues for joint decisionmaking included the Assembly, the Council, and the deme
(village) assemblies. Service on the Council of 500 involved
particularly intense interaction. The Council met about 275 days a
year. During the one-tenth of the year that each member served on
the fifty-person executive committee, he was expected to live and
work in the Council chamber with the rest of the committee.
Participation in several civic institutions—Council service, military
service, and performance of the dithyrambic chorus at the Festival
of Dionysus, for example—was organized according to tribe,
which meant that one was more likely to participate alongside
members of one’s local village. Repeated productive interactions
in these various contexts between collaborators and the men of the
Piraeus may have helped to rebuild trust and foster cooperation
after the restoration of democracy.
5.

CONTEMPORARY LESSONS

Every society in transition must manage the inherent tension
between the impulse to go back over the past—to understand, to
record for history, to judge, and to punish—and the impulse to
move on, to forfeit full accountability in the interests of peace and
reconciliation. 143 We have seen that ancient Athens’ successful
142 Caitlin Donnelly & Joanne Hughes, Contact and Culture: Mechanisms of
Reconciliation in Schools in Northern Ireland and Israel, in RECONCILIATION(S):
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 147, 150 (Joanna R. Quinn ed.,
2009).
143 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the tension between
acknowledgement and recovery when dealing with past atrocities).
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reconciliation managed this tension in a unique way. The
Athenians put the past behind them by instituting a formal
amnesty, by creating a unifying (and misleading) collective
narrative of the war, and by providing opportunities for the
reintegration of collaborators in the democracy and shared
experiences between former antagonists. At the same time,
Athens’ legal institutions offered an outlet for private, local
resentments by providing ordinary victims with an indirect means
of airing accusations against quite specific oppressors.
What lessons might the Athenian experience offer for those
designing transitional justice institutions today?
Much of
transitional justice scholarship utilizes the case-study method;
scholars analyze the advantages and disadvantages of various
forms of transitional justice institutions in part by examining how
these institutions performed in a variety of historical and/or
contemporary situations. 144 This Article presents Athens as a case
study of how one society was able to move on. 145
The types of lessons we can draw from the Athenian case are
limited by evident cultural differences. The wholesale adoption of
specific Athenian practices is obviously not in the cards,
particularly since the absence of the rule of law is a feature of the
system rather than a bug. Rather, as noted previously, the
Athenian case provides some mid-level observations about factors
that may contribute to a successful transition. The Athenian
experience suggests (1) the importance of granularity, that is,
letting individual victims at the local level decide whether to
prosecute their antagonists; and (2) that uncovering the truth is not
always the best way to ensure peace and reconciliation following
144 See generally RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT
SOCIETIES (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (citing several individual case studies);
ELSTER, supra note 3 (discussing a variety of historical examples of transitional
justice); MINOW, supra note 1 (analyzing the different emotional and political
responses to atrocities which were adopted by various countries and populations
throughout history); TEITEL, supra note 2 (drawing comparisons between several
historical and contemporary approaches to transitional justice); Koskenniemi,
supra note 85 (discussing the function of trials in the context of war crimes in
Europe); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3 (analyzing the costs and benefits of
transitional justice in the context of several historical transitions).
145 It is, of course, impossible to draw definitive conclusions from any
individual case study. Rather, each case study is merely suggestive, offering some
insight into how a particular approach to transitional justice played out in a
specific context. Hypotheses derived from individual case studies must then be
tested against other case studies, with close attention to cultural, political, or
economic factors that might cause a successful approach to fail in other contexts.
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atrocities. These observations from the Athenian case offer insight
into prominent contemporary issues in transitional justice. First,
the Athenian experience suggests that attention to local
resentments and ordinary victims and perpetrators may be just as
important as centralized, exemplary justice or the exposure of the
command structure behind atrocities. Second, the Athenian
experience invites us to reexamine whether the focus on truth
seeking (so common in contemporary transitional justice
institutions) is well founded. In this Part, I will explore each of
these claims in some detail.
5.1. Addressing Local Resentments Through Private Complaint
Procedures
The Athenian experience suggests that piecemeal private
prosecution or complaint procedures at the local level may be as
important as the more centralized, systematic schemes directed by
public officials that tend to dominate contemporary transitional
justice institutions.
We have seen that ancient Athens had no systematic program
of punishing, or even excluding from office, former oligarchic
sympathizers. Most of the high-level officials under the Thirty fled
to Eleusis or into exile, and the remainder of the population was
protected from direct litigation by the Amnesty. Rather, indirect
sanctions for collaboration were initiated by individual victims and
acquaintances, which provided a safety valve to ease local
resentment in the absence of direct sanctions. Punishment for
collaboration was selective and exemplary, in the sense that many
collaborators escaped these accusations, but there was no official
decision to single out particular offenders for punishment. In this
way, the flexibility of the Athenian legal system mitigated the
tension between ordinary, rule-of-law justice and expedient
political settlement. The Athenian approach also created the
possibility of piecemeal retributive justice without forcing the allor-nothing choice that a comprehensive, top-down system invites.
Many modern forms of transitional justice, particularly
prosecutions, involve a centralized approach that attempts to focus
selectively on the most serious violations and, to the extent
possible, high-level offenders. 146 Most contemporary criminal
146 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 31, 40–45 (describing the factors which
influence selectivity in prosecution and punishment as well as the dangers of this
selectivity); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 27–68 (discussing various successor trials
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approaches involve prosecutors or other public officials
consciously selecting individual defendants whose trials can
provide exemplary justice, in addition to furthering other goals,
including the shaping of collective memory. 147 Most students of
transitional justice assume that one aim of these selective
approaches should be to focus on tracing responsibility as far up
the chain of command as possible. 148 Instances where low-level
actors have faced prosecution, such as the trial of German guards
for shooting individuals attempting to escape over the Berlin Wall,
have drawn widespread criticism. 149 Indeed, the difficulty of
proving criminal responsibility for high-level actors is commonly
cited as an advantage that truth commissions have over criminal
prosecutions. 150 Most of these modern approaches are not just
deliberately selective; they are also deliberately centralized. In fact,
some scholars have argued that the very act of transferring the
responsibility for accusation and punishment from victims to
public bodies is absolutely essential to ending hatred and
promoting reconciliation. 151
The Athenian example suggests that given the inevitably
selective nature of transitional justice, centralization and focusing
exclusively on major crimes and high-level officials may be
misguided. The Athenian experience is in keeping with some
recent research on contemporary transitions noting that victims
throughout the course of history which have held prior political regimes
responsible for past injustices).
147 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 46 (“[C]ollective memory probably can
only be enshrined through trials if the intention to achieve this end is concealed
from the public audience . . . .”); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (analyzing the role
that legal processes play in constructing transitional narratives of history).
148 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 40–42, 59–61 (discussing the perceived
unfairness of prosecuting subordinates without holding their superiors
responsible and the need to prioritize the interests of the victims).
149 See id. at 59 (describing a similar chain of command involved in the
atrocities in South Africa and emphasizing the difficulty of unraveling this type of
hierarchical responsibility); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 40 (describing the broad scope
of the trials in Germany after the Berlin Wall shootings).
150 See MINOW, supra note 1, at 60–61 (stating that one advantage truth
commissions have over trials is the commissions’ ability to assign blame to highlevel actors in cases where the chain of responsibility would be hard to establish
in a court of law).
151 See id. at 11–12 (discussing the commonly-held view that “the way to
avoid such escalating violence,” arising out of hatred and a desire for vengeance,
“is to transfer the responsibilities for apportioning blame and punishment from
victims to public bodies acting according to the rule of law”).
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often find investigations and prosecutions of local, low-level
perpetrators more satisfying than punishment or investigation of
high-level offenders. 152 The Athenian case offers some support for
approaches that do not maintain a centralized monopoly on
prosecutions but rather provide outlets for individual victims to
pursue local grievances, including grievances against relatively
low-level offenders. Modern approaches in this vein include the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Gacaca courts of Rwanda. In South Africa, individual victims were
provided the opportunity to give testimony before the human
rights committee in a non-adversarial format. 153 In Rwanda, each
local community—acting through the local general assembly—met
to identify for trial those suspected of involvement in local
As these two examples demonstrate, such
massacres. 154
decentralized, locally focused, victim-centered approaches can take
a variety of forms, and can be deployed alongside more systematic,
top-down institutions. 155 The Athenian experience does not
recommend a particular institutional design, but merely suggests
that approaches that provide an outlet for local, individual

152 See, e.g., ISAACS, supra note 128, at 136 (citing the Guatemala case as an
example where victims “frequently insist that neighbors, friends, and relatives are
guilty, implicated in the crimes whether as informants or as executioners”);
Stover, supra note 128, at 106, 115 (emphasizing the importance victims placed on
receiving explanations and apologies from their neighbors and seeing fellow
citizens being brought to justice).
153 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 72–74 (emphasizing the contrast between
the more communal qualities of truth commissions and the rigid, discrete roles of
traditional courts).
154 See KAREKEZI, supra note 128, at 72 (describing at the local level how
Gacaca courts were implemented by observing three phases that were common
practices throughout all gacaca courts); Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and
“Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 777–89 (2007) (describing the evolution of the gacaca
courts in Rwanda and the multifaceted purposes served by these courts in the
Rwandan government and community).
155 In South Africa, individual victim testimony was combined with, among
other things, a more centralized investigative process that issued a report; the
Rwandan genocide was addressed not only in the Gacaca courts but also in the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and more formal domestic criminal
trials. See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional
Context: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, in RECONCILIATIONS: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 87 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (“Through the
face-to-face participation of all community members in gacaca, the government
sought to establish truth, justice, and reconciliation on the basis of Rwandan
custom.”).
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resentments can minimize the “impunity gap” created by selective
justice, thereby fostering reconciliation at the local level.
5.2. Questioning the Value of Truth in Reconciliation
Most controversially, the Athenian case casts doubt on an
underlying assumption held by many who study transitional
justice: the importance of establishing and recording the truth
behind mass atrocities. 156 The recent proliferation of truth and
reconciliation commissions is indicative of a widespread belief that
investigating and recording how atrocities came about is an
essential component of reconciliation. 157
And yet, accurately assigning responsibility for atrocities
committed during the tyranny played no role in Athens’
spectacularly successful transition.
We have seen that the
Athenian courts created a false collective memory of the war,
which focused blame narrowly on the Thirty and denied the
widespread collaboration and participation by ordinary Athenians
in the violence. This narrative appears to have promoted a sense of
unity among the populace. To be sure, the use of these fictions in
court did not erase individual victims’ resentment against specific
collaborators who had done them harm. But the collective
memory of the oligarchy constructed in the courts may have made
victims more willing to trust men whose level of active
collaboration was minimal or unknown to them. For those who
had remained in the city, the discourse in the courts offered a
rationalization for past collaboration and provided comfort that
there was a place for them in the restored democracy.
The Athenian experience suggests that there may be some
instances where a shared fiction might do more to foster unity and
reconciliation than the truth. 158 The myth of widespread popular

156 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (discussing the establishment of
historical truth as a central function of transitional justice). But see Erin Daly,
Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition, 2 INT.’L J.
OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 36–39 (2008) (providing a more skeptical account of the
role of truth in reconciliation).
157 See, e.g., Geoff Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission
Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 45 (2010) (analyzing the proliferation and evolution
of truth commissions throughout the world).
158 I am not suggesting consciously attempting to create such a shared fiction,
which poses all sorts of difficulties. See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 240–92 (discussing
the promises and pitfalls of consciously creating collective memory, including the
creation of misleading accounts of history). Rather, I am simply suggesting that
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opposition in France to the Nazi occupation provides a similar
example. 159 Of course, there may be independent normative
reasons to insist on uncovering the truth regarding prior atrocities.
But the Athenian case suggests that at least in some situations
pursuing a true account of who bears responsibility for atrocities
may not be necessary, or even desirable, if the primary aim is to
ensure an enduring, peaceful reconciliation.
The Athenian courts did not seek to hash out the truth; because
there was no public prosecutor and no detailed understanding of
what constituted collaboration, they did not stir up grievances
unnecessarily. But they also allowed the airing of any wrong, no
matter how old or unconnected to the subject of the suit.
Moreover, they were inscrutable in their adjudications—no one
knew why the jurors decided as they did, and no rule was
established. Did the jury believe that an allegation of collaboration
was untrue, or did it find that the allegation, even if true, was
outweighed by other factors? No one knew. But clarity in the
wake of civil war is not necessarily a virtue. People told their story
and got their verdict; they believed what they wanted to believe
about what the verdict meant. The system moved on to the next
case, and slowly everyone got on with his or her lives.

the widespread assumption that uncovering the truth is necessary to a successful
transition may be incorrect.
159 See id. at 101 (describing how the initial scope of the postwar criminal
trials in France was limited to high-ranking officials and to those in other
prominent positions, although in many cases the general population also
participated in the atrocities).
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